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Why Do We Ask the Same Questions? The Triple Helix
Dilemma Revisited*
Richard Delgado** and Jean Stefancic***
In revisiting their Stanford Law Review article, "Why Do We Tell the Same
Stories: Law Reform, Critical Librarianship, and the Triple Helix Dilemma,"
Professors Delgado and Stefancic contend that computer-assisted legal
research has not proven to be a boon to the cause of law reform. At the time
of the first article, the computer revolution, which irreversibly changed how
we research legal questions, was just dawning. In this article, they focus again
on categorical thinking, but this time to examine whether it is possible to
transcend the categories our minds bring to computer-based searching when
we do not know exactly what we are looking for They describe and compare
paper-based and computerized research tools, review some of the claims that
have been made for the latter and show how electronic searching retains many
of the constraints of the print version. After surveying the pace of law reform
in a few selected areas, they conclude that the computer revolution has not
accelerated reform but very possibly slowed it. They posit a few reasons why
this may be so and end with a number of suggestions for law reformers.
Introduction: The Locked Room
1 In the classic mystery, The Murders in the Rue Morgue, Madame L'Espanaye
and her daughter are found dead at their residence on the Rue Morgue in Paris.'
The daughter is found in her seemingly impenetrable bedroom, all the windows
and doors locked from the inside. Witnesses on the street report hearing screams
and a struggle. They could distinguish two voices, a gruff voice seemingly speaking
French, and a shrill one speaking an unrecognizable foreign language. Examining
the facts of the case and the clues presented, the police make little progress in the
* © Richard Delgado and Jean Stefancic, 2007. This article was prepared for inclusion with other
papers delivered at Legal Information and the Development of American Law: Further Thinking
about the Thoughts of Bob Berring, a symposium held at Boalt Hall on the University of California,
Berkeley campus, Oct. 21, 2006.
** University Distinguished Professor of Law & Derrick Bell Fellow, University of Pittsburgh School of
Law, Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania.
*** Research Professor of Law & Derrick Bell Scholar, University of Pittsburgh School of Law,
Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania. Thanks to Richard Danner for organizing this symposium and to Jamison
Arimoto and Matthew Fergus for research assistance. We gratefully acknowledge the suggestions
of Michele Kristakis, Sallie Smith, and Valerie Weis, as well as our faculty colleagues at University
of Pittsburgh who provided helpful feedback at a workshop: Kevin Ashley, Derrick Bell, William
Brown, David Herring, Bernard Hibbitts, Michael Madison, Jane Moriarty, and George Taylor.
1. Edgar Allen Poe, The Murders in the Rue Morgue, GRAHAM'S MAG., Apr. 1841, at 166, available at
http://poe.thefreelibrary.com/lMurders-in-the-Rue-Morgue.
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investigation. No motive is apparent, and it was impossible for anyone to escape
from that bedroom.
2 Not until the brilliant Auguste Dupin arrives on the scene does a break
appear in the case. Dupin does not think in terms of impossibilities like the police,
but rather of what is possible. He is not bound to comparing the crime to the modus
operandi of previous crimes. Able to look at the evidence with an open mind,
Dupin can consider the possibility that the murderer was not a person at all. He
ultimately discovers that the true culprit was an orangutan.
2
3 Almost twenty years ago, the two of us published some thoughts on the
role of legal research tools in law reform. In "Why Do We Tell the Same Stories:
Law Reform, Critical Librarianship, and the Triple Helix Dilemma,' 3 we asked
why legal stories displayed such a remarkable sameness. We rejected the usual
explanations: law's innate conservatism; the requirement that every statement be
supported by a previous one; bar rules requiring that lawyers acquire a common
stock of knowledge; and, in law school, the tyranny of the casebook.4
4 Although a few legal innovators had managed to break free from these
constraints, an objective observer casting an impartial eye over the landscape of
legal stories would be struck by how much they resemble each other, by how thor-
oughly they track themes of incremental reform carried out within the bounds of
the Anglo-American common law tradition, and by how slowly they change.
5
5 Our article focused on a little noticed source of this sameness-namely,
commercially prepared research systems that lawyers and legal scholars use to
find precedents, arguments, and ideas. 6 These devices, including the West Digest
System with its arrangement of headnotes and numbered categories, operate like
DNA, enabling lawyers to find lines of relevant cases; they both facilitate thought
and inhibit the development of new forms of it.7 A researcher who employs the
West Digest System, for example, begins with one idea. Closely related ideas and
cases then quickly come to light; innovative jurisprudence, which might require a
new tool entirely, can easily remain undeveloped. 8
6 Existing indexing systems thus function like eyeglasses that we have worn
for a long time. They enable us to see better, but conceal the possibility that we
2. Owned by a sailor, the orangutan escaped from his owner's apartment with a razor in his hairy
hand. By an improbable series of events, he found himself face to face with the two women who,
understandably, panicked. After dispatching both, he stuffed one in the chimney and tossed the other
out the fourth floor window, from which he made an athletic escape, releasing a spring-loaded catch
on his way out. The crime scene, which looked airtight but impossible, posed a conundrum that the
unimaginative detectives were unable to crack.
3. Richard Delgado & Jean Stefancic, Why Do We Tell the Same Stories? Law Reform, Critical
Librarianship, and the Triple Helix Dilemma, 42 STAN. L. REV. 207 (1989).
4. Id. at 207-08. This is not to say that these other forces do not channel legal thought, they do. See infra
notes 17 & 71 and accompanying text. Rather, cognitive categories inscribed in our research tools and
habits do so much more efficaciously and invisibly. See infra 1 5-8, 27-39.
5. Delgado & Stefancic, supra note 3, at 208.
6. Id. at 208-17.
7. Id. at 208.
8. Id. at 208-09.
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might be able to see even better with a different pair. Yet, even when we discover
that better pair, it too begins to set limits on what we can see. We move from one
set of limitations to another slightly less confining one in an unending process that
seems inherent in our condition.
9
J7 We wrote at the dawn of the computer revolution which has radically
altered how attorneys carry out legal research. 10 No longer is the researcher
confined to the cases listed under a headnote number in the West Digest
System. With online full-text research, the lawyer searching for precedent may
devise a search as complex or as simple as he or she likes.'' The only limit
is one's imagination. If the lawyer asks the computer for a list of cases about
cows that wander onto highways, it will obligingly spew forth every last one
in the database. 12 Or if the lawyer asks it for opinions that discuss open and
closed range liability rules, it will bring these up in a nanosecond.' 3 Computer
9. Id. at 225.
10. Id. at 220 (observing that computer-assisted research, then in early stages of development, could
easily "freeze" the law by limiting searches to concrete words or expressions and by discouraging
browsing and analogical reasoning).
II. E.g., Carol M. Bast & Ransford C. Pyle, Legal Research in the Computer Age: A Paradigm Shift,
93 LAW LIBR. J. 285, 294 (2001); Daniel P. Dabney, The Curse of Thamus: An Analysis of Full-Text
Legal Document Retrieval, 78 LAW LIBR. J. 5, 20 (1986). For other works on the role of categories
and indexing in research-both conventional and electronic-and their impact on the structure of law,
see Richard Haigh, What Shall I Wear to the Computer Revolution? Some Thoughts on Electronic
Researching in Law, 89 LAW LIBR. J. 245 (1997); Robert C. Berring, The Evolution of Research:
Legal Research and the World of Thinkable Thoughts, 2 J. App. PRAC. & PROCESS 305 (2000) [here-
inafter Berring, Evolution]; Allan Hanson, From Key Numbers to Keywords: How Automation Has
Transformed the Law, 94 LAW LiBR. J. 563 (2002); David Post, The Law is Where You Find It, AM.
LAW., Mar. 1996, at 98; Paul Hellyer, Assessing the Influence of Computer-Assisted Legal Research:
A Study of California Supreme Court Opinions, 97 LAW LIBR. J. 285 (2005); Samuel E. Trosow, The
Database and the Fields of Law: Are There New Divisions of Labor? 96 LAW LIBR. J. 63 (2004);
Robert Berring, Chaos, Cyberspace and Tradition: Legal Information Transmogrified, 12 BERKELEY
TECH. L.J. 1 (1997) [hereinafter Berring, Chaos]; Barbara Bintliff, From Creativity to Computerese:
Thinking Like a Lawyer in the Computer Age, 88 LAW LIBR. J. 338 (1996); Robert C. Berring,
Legal Information and the Search for Cognitive Authority, 88 CAL. L. REV. 1673 (2000) [herein-
after Berring, Cognitive Authority]; Robert C. Berring, Full-Text Databases and Legal Research:
Backing into the Future, I HIGH TECH. L.J. 27 (1986) [hereinafter Berring, Backing into the Future];
Robert C. Berring, Collapse of the Structure of the Legal Research Universe: The Imperative of
Digital Information, 69 WASH. L. REV. 9 (1994) [hereinafter Berring, Collapse]; Molly Warner Lien,
Technocentrism and the Soul of the Common Law Lawyer, 48 AM. U.L. REV. 85 (1998); Steven
M. Barkan, Deconstructing Legal Research: A Law Librarian's Commentary on Critical Legal
Studies, 79 LAW LIBR. J. 617 (1987). On the computer revolution generally, see ETHAN KATSH, THE
ELECTRONIC MEDIA AND THE TRANSFORMATION OF LAW (1989) [hereinafter KATSH, TRANSFORMATION
OF LAW]; ETHAN KATSH, LAW IN A DIGITAL WORLD (1995) [hereinafter KATSH, DIGITAL WORLD]; Peter
C. Schanck, Taking Up Barkan 's Challenge: Looking at the Judicial Process and Legal Research, 82
LAW LIBR. J. 1 (1990).
12. See Delgado & Stefancic, supra note 3, at 221 (citing this example). However, the lawyer will not
retrieve a case that discusses heifers and roads.
13. See, e.g., Robert Ellickson, Of Coase and Cattle: Dispute Resolution Among Neighbors in Shasta
County, 38 STAN. L. REV. 623 (1986). Ellickson discusses how Western ranchers behave under the
two systems of rules. Open range rules allow cattle to roam freely and impose the obligation to fence
in property on any farmers who wish to protect their crops. Closed range regimes, by contrast, require
ranchers to fence in their land and penalize them if their cattle escape and trample a neighbor's cab-
bages. Ellickson found that neighbors behave in roughly the same way under both systems and that
the governing rules made little difference.
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searching frees legal researchers from West's rigid categories and puts them
in touch with a postmodern world of cases and phrases limited only by
their imagination and ability to formulate search commands with the aid of
Boolean logic.14
8 Computerized legal research is a godsend for lawyers who know exactly
what they are looking for. What about lawyers who don't know what they are
looking for, say, one who confronts a case of first impression or one calling for
an entirely new legal theory? Has computerized searching freed lawyers from the
constraints we wrote about two decades ago and opened the door to creativity
and legal innovation? Many experts in the field of information technology have
thought so; the literature is full of extravagant celebrations of the new order.15 Our
contention is that it has not; indeed, that our predicament is little better than it was
in the days of searching in the dusty volumes of the West decennial digests and, in
some respects, more acute. Computer-assisted legal research may in fact impede
the search for new legal ideas, slow the pace of law reform, and make the legal
system less, not more, just.
16
9 This article proceeds in four parts. The first describes computerized
research and how it differs from the old paper-based kind. The second reviews
some of the claims that have been made for computerized research and what
it can do. The third shows how electronic searching has not eliminated the
constraints of the old categorical system. The categories formerly inscribed in
the West Digest System, where they guided searches along predictable lines,
remain in our minds where they limit what we can do just as effectively as they
did when they were overt and on the page. Disciplinary rules, bar examination
requirements, and the legal curriculum give all lawyers a common stock of ideas
and categories. And, since one can only think in terms of words and categories,1
7
they also limit the range of queries a researcher, poised over the keyboard, is
likely to ask. Moreover, limitations inherent in databases and computer search-
ing channel this form of research in ways that did not constrain old-fashioned
hard-copy searching.
10 The fourth and final part gives examples of how the old legal categories
limit thought even today and shows how computerized searching can mask the
14. See infra 17-26.
15. See infra U 21-26. But see Jean Stefancic & Richard Delgado, Outsider Jurisprudence and the
Electronic Revolution: Will Technology Help or Hinder the Cause of Law Reform? 52 Ouo ST. L.J. 847
(1991) (casting doubt on this optimistic review and positing an early version of our current thesis).
16. See infra 11 27-44.
17. See Linda Krieger, The Content of our Categories: A Cognitive Bias Approach to Discrimination
and Equal Employment Opportunity, 47 STAN. L. REV. 1161 (1995); Barkan, supra note 11, at 631;
see also Duncan Kennedy, The Structure of Blackstone's Commentaries, 28 BuFF. L. REV. 209, 215
(1979) (noting how traditional categories, dating back to the time of Blackstone, dictate the terms
in which lawyers think); Haigh, supra note 11, at 261-62 (noting that computer searching may not
liberate lawyers from the oppressive hand of West categories because textbooks and legal custom will
continue to reinforce traditional ways of conceiving legal issues).
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need for innovation. Unlike traditional searching, the computerized kind can lead
to perseveration18 and a focus on the minutiae of fact patterns, when the situation
calls, instead, for an imaginative leap that sees a type of case in an entirely new
light. This part also surveys the pace of legal breakthroughs, both in academic
literature and in the world of law practice, and concludes that legal innovation
has not surged with the advent of computerized searching, but has, if anything,
slowed.
Legal Research: From West Headnotes to Full-Text
Computerized Databases
Traditional Hard-Copy Legal Research
11 Prior to the electronic revolution of the early 1980s, lawyers and legal schol-
ars searched for precedent and legal concepts using three principal tools. To find
books, especially general-interest ones, they used the Library of Congress subject
heading system, which provides access to library collections. For legal periodicals,
they used the Index to Legal Periodicals. And they used the West Digest System,
which classifies legal decisions under subject headings and "key numbers" to find
case authority. Even after the advent of computerized research, these tools con-
tinue to find use today.
The Library of Congress Subject Heading System
12 The Library of Congress Subject Headings (LCSH) began in 1898 when
the library adopted the first list of subject headings for its own use. 19 Later
editions reflect changes in the conceptualization of categories and the addi-
tion of new ones, such as wireless communication systems, space flight, or
feminism. 2° A recent edition contained approximately 290,000 headings dis-
played in five volumes spanning 7946 pages. 21 An editorial committee at the
library reviews suggestions for new headings, including many that originate
in-house.22 Critics have charged that the Library of Congress system has been
conservative and slow to change, and is currently abdicating its position of
18. By perseveration we mean the practice of continuing in the same vein even though it is yielding
decreasing returns-mindlessly persisting in an unpromising effort to solve a problem when one
should be taking a different direction. See infra U 27-39.
19. OFFICE FOR SUBJECT CATALOGING POLICY, LIBRARY OF CONGRESS, LIBRARY OF CONGRESS SUBJECT
HEADINGS, at viii (29th ed. 2006) (sometimes called the "big red books").
20. Id.
21. Id. at vii. The Library of Congress adds approximately six thousand to eight thousand headings a
year.
22. Id.; see also CATALOGING POLICY & SUPPORT OFFICE, LIBRARY OF CONGRESS, SUBJECT CATALOGING
MANUAL: SUBJECT HEADINGS H187 (5th ed. 1996-) (updated semiannually) (explaining when a
new heading is appropriate). Other libraries may contribute proposals or changes to LCSH through




leadership. 23 Others charge that its system of headings replicates majoritarian
thought and politics, and gives too little attention to new or emerging theories
and ideas.
24
The Index to Legal Periodicals and Current Law Index
13 The Index to Legal Periodicals is not the only attempt to provide coverage of
legal journals, but it has been the best known and most comprehensive. It arose
when the American Association of Law Libraries (AALL) in 1908 published the
first volume, indexing the contents of about forty journals.25 The Index soon grew,
however, under the auspices of an advisory committee that suggested new sub-
ject headings and consulted with the H.W. Wilson Company, the publisher of the
Index, on matters of policy. 26 Disagreements eventually caused the Index and the
Association to go their separate ways in 1978.27
14 AALL then negotiated with Information Access Company to create a new
tool, Current Law Index, that would compete with the Index to Legal Periodicals.28
That index appeared in 1980, indexing 660 periodicals, about double the coverage
of the old Index to Legal Periodicals.29 Its coverage extends only back to 1980,
however; for materials appearing before that date, the searcher must consult the
older Index to Legal Periodicals. Both services provide a wide array of headings
and categories, but derive them from ostensibly different sources. The Index to
Legal Periodicals for much of its history listed Black's Law Dictionary and, after
1985, West's Legal Thesaurus/Dictionary as sources for most of its legal subject
headings, while the Current Law Index derived its versions from the Library of
Congress system, which, in turn draws most of its headings from Black's Law
Dictionary and the Current Law Index, assuring a remarkable degree of sameness,
if not circularity, in both systems.
30
23. See, e.g., Ronald Crovisier & Sheila S. Intner, Classification for Astronomy, CATALOGING &
CLASSIFICATION Q., 1987, no. 3, at 23 (observing how system betrays its Victorian origins);
David Henige, Library of Congress Subject Headings: Is Euthanasia the Answer, CATALOGING &
CLASSIFICATION Q., 1987, no. 1, at 7, 13-14. For the current controversy over the effectiveness of
library catalogs and information needs of twenty-first-century users, see generally Karen Calhoun,
The Changing Nature of the Catalog and Its Integration With Other Discovery Tools (Mar. 17, 2006),
http://www.loc.gov/catdir/calhoun-report-final.pdf; Thomas Mann, What is Going on at the Library
of Congress? (June 19, 2006), http://www.guild29l0.org/AFSCMEWhatlsGoingOn.pdf.
24. E.g., Sanford Berman, Not Funny Any More, LIBR. J., June 1, 1988, at 80 (giving examples of anach-
ronistic headings); Sanford Berman, Out of the Kitchen-But Not Into the Catalog, 2 TECHNICAL
SERVICES Q. 167 (1984) (exposing how present system discriminates against women).
25. Richard Leiter, A History of Legal Periodical Indexing, LEGAL. REFERENCE SERVICES Q., 1987, no. 1,
at 35, 37-40, 45-46 (1987).
26. Id. at 41-42.
27. Id. at 45.
28. Id. at 46; Howard A. Hood, Review of Current Law Index, 16 INT'L. J. LEGAL INFO. 123 (1988);
Thomas Steele, The Index to Legal Periodicals and Current Law Index-A Comparison, LEGAL
REFERENCE SERVICES Q., 1981, no. 4, at 43.
29. Leiter, supra note 25, at 46.
30. Compare INDEX TO LEGAL PERIODICALS: THESAURUS, at iv (1988) with 8 CURRENT LAW INDEX iii
(1987). See KENT OLSON & ROBERT BERRING, PRACTICAL APPROACHES TO LEGAL RESEARCH 92-93
(1988); PETER ENYINGI ET AL., CATALOGING LEGAL LITERATURE 370 (2d ed. 1988).
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The West Digest System
15 Before the West Company's publication in 1876 of the first compilation of
court reports, The Syllabi, American law was unsystematic and disorganized. As a
result, lawyers encountered great difficulty in knowing what local or national law
was.3' In 1879, the company published the Northwestern Reporter, which included
decisions from the Dakota Territory, Iowa, Michigan, Minnesota, Nebraska, and
Wisconsin.32 Similar regional reporters soon appeared, and within a few years
West had blanketed the country. To provide easy access to relevant cases, West
soon established a system of headnotes and indexing in all its reporters, so that
the researcher interested in a particular legal point (e.g., the liability of a county
government for the acts of an agent) could easily locate the relevant cases.33 When
the American Bar Association endorsed the Key Number Digest, West's role in
indexing and reporting American cases acquired semi-official status.
34
16 The West Digest System has not escaped criticism. Like the Index to Legal
Periodicals, Current Law Index, and the Library of Congress subject heading
system, critics charge that West is conservative and slow in recognizing new legal
categories and that the near-monopoly that its digest system acquired constitutes a
kind of cage into which the law itself had to be fit.35
Computer-Assisted Legal Research
17 Beginning in the late 1970s, legal research went through a period of change when
Lexis and Westlaw developed competing computerized legal research systems that
eliminated much of the work of manually sorting through opinions and secondary
materials.36 In the mid-1960s, the Ohio State Bar Association formed a committee
31. See Albert Kocourek, Classification of Law, II N.Y.U. L.Q. REV. 319, 328-34 (1934); Roscoe Pound,
Classification of Law, 37 HARV. L. REV. 933, 938-59 (1924); Henry T. Terry, Arrangement of the
Law, 15 U. ILL. L. REV. 61, 61-62 (1920); Thomas Woxland, "Forever Associated with the Practice
of Law ": The Early Years of the West Publishing Company, LEGAL REFERENCE SERVICES Q., 1985, no.
I, at 115, 116; see also Berring, Backing into the Future, supra note 11, at 29-31; Berring, Chaos,
supra note 11, at 189-95 (describing history of the West empire).
32. WEST, LAW FINDER 5 (1988); see also Berring, Backing into the Future, supra note 11, at 31-33;
Berring, Chaos, supra note 11, at 90-95; Bintliff, supra note 1I, at 341-43.
33. See WILLIAM MARVIN, WEST PUBLISHING COMPANY: ORIGIN, GROWTH, LEADERSHIP 39 (1969); Berring,
Backing into the Future, supra note 11, at 31-33; Bintliff, supra note 11, at 341-43 (observing that
one who used the West system had to frame an inquiry in its terms).
34. MARVIN, supra note 33, at 74.
35. E.g., Robert Berring, Backing into the Future, supra note 11, at 33-37 (explaining that West editors
were trained to normalize judicial opinions, even anomalous ones, so as to fit them into the pre-exist-
ing structure of categories and key numbers); Berring, Collapse, supra note 11, at 20-22, 28-31
(noting that West system of rigid categories guided legal thought along conventional lines, and that
they mirrored the structure of legal education and the traditional law school curriculum devised by
Christopher Langdell); Bintliff, supra note 11, at 343; Hanson, supra note I1, at 568; Barkan, supra
note 11, at 632.
36. For histories of these times, see, e.g., William G. Harrington, A Brief History of Computer-Assisted
Legal Research, 77 LAW. LIBR. J. 543 (1984-85); Berring, Backing into the Future, supra note 11, at
37-39; Berring, Chaos, supra note 11, at 195-99.
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to explore the possibility of harnessing computers in the service of legal research.3 7
Learning of a system developed by the Data Corporation for the Air Force, the Ohio
committee contracted with that corporation to develop a similar system for legal
research. 38 When the Mead Corporation acquired Data Corporation, the parent orga-
nization formed a subsidiary, Mead Data Central, for the sole purpose of developing
a legal research service.39 By 1973, Mead Data Central had developed a computer-
ized service, Lexis, that it began marketing nationwide.40
18 Eager to protect its near-monopoly in the field of legal research, the West
Publishing Company countered by marketing Westlaw as a competitor to Lexis.
4 1
When unveiled in 1975, West's service was inferior to Lexis, largely because its data-
base consisted of little more than the text of West headnotes.42 In time, West improved
Westlaw so that by 1983 it had become almost as powerful and user-friendly as Lexis.
4 3
19 Today, few legal researchers looking for case authority rely on the old West
index or decennial digests.' By the same token, few legal scholars looking for
articles or books discussing a legal idea consult the Index to Legal Periodicals or
the local library's card catalog.45 Instead, they type a keyword search into a data-
base such as LexisNexis or Westlaw that covers all the major legal journals and
publications. If they are searching for a book, they check a computerized database
such as WorldCat, Google, or even Amazon.com.
20 All these electronic tools are faster and more convenient than consult-
ing several decennial digest volumes, the Index to Legal Periodicals, the Library
37. Harrington, supra note 36, at 544-45; Berring, Chaos, supra note 11, at 195-99.
38. Harrington, supra note 36, at 547; Berring, Backing into the Future, supra note 11, at 38; Bering,
Chaos, supra note 11, at 196.
39. Harrington, supra note 36, at 550; Berring, Chaos, supra note 11, at 196.
40. Harrington, supra note 36, at 552; Berring, Backing into the Future, supra note 11, at 38; Berring,
Chaos, supra note 11, at 195-96.
41. Harrington, supra note 36, at 553-54; Berring, Backing into the Future, supra note 11, at 38; Berring,
Chaos, supra note 11, at 196.
42. Harrington, supra note 36, at 553; Berring, Chaos, supra note 11, at 196.
43. Harrington, supra note 36, at 554-55; Berring, Backing into the Future, supra note 11, at 38. Both
services are now divisions of large multinational corporations. In 1994, Reed Elsevier purchased
LexisNexis, while Thomson Publishing Co. purchased Westlaw two years later. Today, most of the
American legal publishing industry is owned by a handful of multinational companies. Costs have
risen accordingly; some law libraries are cancelling certain print services entirely. See generally
KENDALL F. SVENGALIS, LEGAL INFORMATION BUYER'S GUIDE & REFERENCE MANUAL 3-5 (2005).
44. See Bast & Pyle, supra note 11, at 299. With computers, a generational gap yawns. Young researchers
rely on their computers, while older lawyers and professors are apt to rely on hard-copy sources. See,
e.g., Berring, Evolution, supra note 11, at 313; Berring, Cognitive Authority, supra note 11, at 1677;
Berring, Backing Into the Future, supra note 11, at 57.
45. As with computers generally-see supra note 44--the gap in searching practices seems generational, with
younger users searching for articles or books on a computer, and older practitioners and scholars using
books and printed indexes. Recently, however, the Index to Legal Periodicals became part of the online
WilsonWeb Index, where it is divided into three separate components: (1) the Index to Legal Periodicals
1907-1981, listing citations only; (2) the Index of Legal Periodicals Full Text, which extends back to 1994
and provides full-text coverage of about a fifth of the articles in indexes; (3) the Index to Legal Periodicals
and Books, indexing the same period and journals as the full-text version but providing only citations to
articles and books. Other familiar tools are also online; LegalTrac, for example, is an updated electronic
version of the Current Law Index, which is still also published in paper.
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of Congress subject headings, or the various legal encyclopedias and practice
books that combine the contents of each in a format useful for lawyers in certain
specialized practice areas.46 With computerized research one merely types one's
search into an office computer or laptop and the results spill out in a few seconds,
leaving little need for a trip to a library or notes on a yellow pad. But is this form
of research better in those troubling cases falling between existing categories or
calling for innovation? Does it escape the powerful channeling function that we
described in our Stanford Law Review article? Many writers have thought so. For
them, computerized legal research is not just quicker, it is qualitatively better: more
creative, powerful, and flexible.
The Usual Story: Computerized Legal Research
Is Not Only Quicker Than the Old Kind, But Better
21 Many experts in the information science field have asserted that computer-
ized legal research is not only more convenient than the old paper-and-pencil
kind, but better. These assertions, many of which come accompanied by little
empirical evidence, include that computer-assisted legal research is more flex-
ible than the traditional kind,47 that it is deeper and more comprehensive,48 and
that it is more creative than what came before.49 Running through this literature
46. See Haigh, supra note 11, at 249 (noting that computers are faster than hard-copy searching for well-
defined, concrete searches, especially ones based on facts rather than abstract categories or theories,
but not otherwise); see also KATSH, TRANSFORMATION OF LAW, supra note 11, at 45. Of course, the
cases come spilling out shorn of context. No helpful West headnote editor has conveniently located
one case about the liability of a municipality for the acts of a trash collector with all the others and
identified key differences among them, or located them right next to a similar group of cases about
dog-catcher liability. See Berring, Backing into the Future, supra note 11, at 54; Schanck, supra note
11, at 21 (suggesting that it would be advantageous if computer systems began to incorporate the
elements of indexing-in effect introducing a level of human judgment between the user and the raw
data).
47. E.g., KATSH, DIGITAL WORLD, supra note 11, at 67, 70-73, 76 (describing computer searching as
more flexible, comprehensive, and free-flowing than the manual variety); Ethan Katsh, Law in a
Digital World: Computer Networks and Cyberspace, 38 VILL. L. REV. 403, 477-79 (1994); Berring,
Collapse, supra note 11, at 29. But see Haigh, supra note 11, at 251-54 (electronic searching not
always more flexible than the old-fashioned manual kind).
48. See, e.g., Katsh, supra note 47, at 477-48; KATSH, DIGITAL WORLD, supra note 11, at 5 (a "computer
... [is] much more than a 'wonderful book'). But see David C. Blair & M.E. Maron, An Evaluation
of Retrieval Effectiveness for a Full-Text Document-Retrieval System, 28 COMM. A.C.M. 289 (1985)
(finding that computer-assisted research systems retrieved no more than about 20% of the documents
relevant to search queries); Haigh, supra note 11, at 251 (contending that electronic searching is not
as powerful or deep as commonly thought).
49. See infra 91 29-39; see also KATsH, DIGITAL WORLD, supra note I1, at 68-69, 79-83; Katsh, supra
note 47, at 477-78 (arguing that computer searching breaks down distances between disciplines and
areas of information). But see Haigh, supra note 11, at 251-52, 261; Hanson, supra note I1, at 580,
582, 585-88, 592 (noting that computer searching can result in a scattered, delegitimated legal profes-
sion); Lien, supra note 11, at 92, 101, 112-13 (arguing that computerized searching is not likely to
render the user more creative than before, and citing studies showing that computer use generally did
not boost creativity and right-brain thinking, and some that showed that it reduced it).
Law Library Journal
is the conviction that computerized searching is changing the very substance of
the law.
50
22 A number of authorities argue that computerized legal research is more
flexible than the previous kind because the searcher may frame any type of
search query, without regard to a pre-existing category such as a West key-
note. 5' Because of this freedom, lawyers may "break down informational dis-
tances" 52 between one legal area and another and "reconfigure categories"' 53 in
novel and richer ways. Computerized searching allows us to escape the bonds
of formalism.
5 4
23 For many of the same reasons, computer-assisted research can be more
creative than the old kind. Because pre-existing categories do not constrain it,
electronic searching can proceed free from the filters of categorical thinking.
55
This freedom allows creativity and encourages law reform.
56
24 Robert Berring heralds computerized information delivery's ability to
breathe new life into the common law as attorneys base their arguments on dif-
ferent cases, forcing judges to take them into account as they formulate their
opinions. 51 Computer-assisted research will also promote legal realism, because
lawyers can find all the previous opinions of a judge and present them to him or
50. See, e.g., Post, supra note 11, at 98; Haigh, supra note 11, at 257; Berring, Backing into the Future,
supra note 11, at 29; Berring, Evolution, supra note 11, at 311-14 (noting that the old conceptual
universe of legally thinkable thoughts, reinforced by and reflected in West categories, is dying); Bast
& Pyle, supra note 11, at 286-89 (computer-assisted legal research is ushering in a paradigm shift in
the law itself); Bintliff, supra note 11, at 339 ("computer's impact on law is conceivably greater and
more fundamental than almost any other development of the last hundred years").
51. See supra note 47 and accompanying text and infra note 55; Delgado & Stefancic, supra note 3, at
219-20 (noting effect of West system of key numbers and digest categories), 220-21 (questioning
whether computerized searching solves this problem); Bintliff, supra note 11, at 341-44 (noting
that West categories formerly guided thought); Berring, Cognitive Authority, supra note 11, at 1693
(same); Hanson, supra note 11, at 564, 570 (same); Dabney, supra note 11, at 8, 20 (noting that full-
text systems contain little in the way of indexing, but by relying on the user to give structure to his or
her search, they "put[ ] the success of the search ... into (his or her) hands ... and this may not be
all good").
52. KATSH, DIGITAL WORLD, supra note 11, at 68-69, 79-83; Katsh, supra note 47, at 479; Ethan Katsh,
Digital Lawyers: Orienting the Legal Profession to Cyberspace, 55 U. Prir. L. REV. 1141, 1157-59
(1994). But see KATSH, TRANSFORMATION OF LAW, supra note 11, at 46 (warning that with electronic
searching, law's inconsistencies can also come to the fore as lawyers are able to find a case for practi-
cally every proposition, so that the myth of the rule of law comes into question).
53. See sources cited supra note 52. See also Hanson, supra note 11, at 585-86 (computerized searching
can boost comparative method in which judges consider cases from other jurisdictions).
54. See Bast & Pyle, supra note 11, at 285-86; Hanson, supra note 11, at 581; Robert C. Berring, Legal
Research and Legal Concepts: Where Form Molds Substance, 75 CAL. L. REV. 15, 26-27 (1987).
55. Bast & Pyle, supra note 11, at 285; Hanson, supra note 11, at 581; Katsh, supra note 47, at 477-78;
Haigh, supra note 11, at 251 (disagreeing with Katsh); Schanck, supra note 11, at 19 (electronic
searching frees searchers from the thrall of formalistic categories and opens up multifarious
possibilities).
56. See sources cited supra note 53; Hanson, supra note 11, at 580, 585-88, 592.
57. Berring, Backing into the Future, supra note 11, at 56; Berring, Cognitive Authority, supra note 11,
at 1690. But see Lien, supra note 11, at 91-92 (doubting that computerized searching will enhance
law reform and progressive change).
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her again. 58 Another writer, without giving specific examples, declared that legal
academics became more creative when they used computerized research, 59 while
two others predicted that computerization would usher in a "paradigm shift" in
the way we practice law.
60
25 A few suggest that computerized research will render the law more
humane, opening up comparative vistas that will enable the American
legal system to burst the bonds of conservatism 61 and escape a form of
Eurocentric bondage in which one Anglo-American lawyer cites another in an
unending chain.
62
26 A few point out that electronic searching feels good, even godlike. 63 With a
computer, one can go anywhere, seemingly find anything. Today's computer-savvy
law students arrive expecting computerized instruction; they find the library "irrel-
evant."64 Lawyers at their computers believe themselves omnipotent, according to
another commentator,65 a confidence that two writers declare finds little support in
the results achieved.
66
Looking a Little Deeper: Computerized Legal Research
Is Subject to Many of the Same Limitations as the Paper-and-Pencil
Kind (Although They Are Harder to See)
27 Some of the claims made on behalf of computers are true-they can retrieve
cases and articles containing concrete, well-defined facts or situations far faster,
and sometimes more comprehensively, than can researchers using traditional hard-
58. Berring, Backing into the Future, supra note 11, at 56; Hanson, supra note 11, at 580, 584, 587-89
(arguing that computers are breaking down hierarchy and disciplinary boundaries).
59. See Hanson, supra note I1, at 589-91 (citing trend to new interdisciplinary journals and areas of
scholarship); see also Frederick Schauer & Virginia Wise, Legal Positivism as Legal Information,
82 CORNELL L. REV. 1080, 1108 (1997); Frederick Schauer & Virginia Wise, Nonlegal Information
and the Delegalization of Law, 29 J. LEGAL STUD. 495 (2000) (asserting that the Supreme Court has
become broader and more ecumenical in its citation practices since the advent of computers). But see
Hellyer, supra note 11 (noting little change in California Supreme Court citation patterns during a
recent period).
60. See Bast & Pyle, supra note 11, at 286-89; see also Haigh, supra note 11, at 256-62; Berring,
Evolution, supra note 11, at 305, 311-13; Berring, Collapse, supra note 11, at 29, 34; Katsh, supra
note 52, at 1164; KATSH, DIGITAL WORLD, supra note II (highlighting generally the many changes
accompanying the digital revolution).
61. See Hanson, supra note 11, at 580; Berring, Backing into the Future, supra note 11, at 56; Lien, supra
note 11, at 93; KATSH, TRANSFORMATION OF LAW, supra note 11, at 20 (arguing that automation is
accelerating the rate of law change).
62. Haigh, supra note 1I, at 261; Hanson, supra note 11, at 581 (positing that computer searching will
boost legal realism and critical legal studies); see also Lien, supra note 11, at 93 (contending that
automation may encourage broad international and comparative vistas); KATSH, TRANSFORMATION OF
LAW, supra note 11, at 47-48 (suggesting that lawyers and judges are able to find secondary mate-
rial-not just cases-more easily than before and therefore cite them as authority).
63. See infra note 87 and accompanying text.
64. Berring, Evolution, supra note 11, at 313; see also supra note 44 and accompanying text.
65. See infra note 87 and accompanying text.
66. See Bast & Pyle, supra note 11, at 292-93.
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copy strategies. 67 But they lose their advantage when one searches for a target that
is abstract or poorly defined. 68 And they are least useful where one needs them
most-when trying to take the measure of a new legal problem or issue.
69
28 The problems with electronic searching include ones associated with the
searcher, as well as ones that stem from the way data come encoded. On the user's
side, computer searching can mire the researcher in a sea of facts.70 It can suppress
browsing and analogical reasoning, while giving the impression that one is freer,
more creative than one really is.71 The reason behind many of these limitations
is the same. The very categorical structure that limited paper-and-pencil search-
ing, building in a bias for the status quo, appears in a new form-the straitjacket
of conventional categories now limits the questions one may ask the computer
and the searches one may devise. The terms and concepts-familiar from the old
digest and index categories and reinforced by disciplinary habits, bar examination
requirements, and the legal curriculum-that formerly steered searchers in predict-
able directions reappear in more insidious form. Now inscribed in our minds, they
limit the questions a researcher can ask. 72 Computers obligingly produce a great
67. E.g., KATSH, DIGITAL WORLD, supra note 11, at 67 (computer searching faster), 70-73, 76 (more flex-
ible, free-flowing, and comprehensive); Lien, supra note 11, at 89, 93 (same, but noting that it also
exhibits a soulless quality). But see Haigh, supra note 11, at 249 (reporting studies showing electronic
searching no faster than traditional kind), 261 (computer retrieval systems better at finding facts than
abstract or complex concepts). See also Richard Delgado, On Taking Back Our Civil Rights Promises:
When Equality Doesn't Compute, 1989 Wis. L. REV. 579, 581-87 (pointing out that even when
computers do greatly aid the law reformer by enabling a legal researcher to demonstrate patterns of
racial disparities, in a corporation's hiring record or pay practices, for example, legal doctrine adapts
by retreating--e.g., by demanding more stringent standards of proof or causation-so that a Title VII
lawyer remains no better off).
68. E.g., Berring, Backing into the Future, supra note 11, at 38-39, 46-48; Bast & Pyle, supra note 11,
at 293; Haigh, supra note 11, at 261; Delgado & Stefancic, supra note 3, at 221; Dabney, supra note
11, at 19; Bintliff, supra note 11, at 346-47; Jon Bing, Performance of Legal Text Retrieval Systems:
The Curse of Boole, 79 LAW LIBR. J. 187, 193 (1987).
69. See infra 29-33. Computerized searching is also expensive, especially for the solo practitioner,
legal services attorney, or pro se litigant. See SVENGALIS, supra note 43 (2004). Open source computer
software (www.opensource.org) and Creative Commons (http://creativecommons.org) technology
mitigate this harshness to some extent.
70. See supra notes 68-69 and accompanying text; infra notes 73-74 and accompanying text; see also
Lien, supra note 11, at 92, 100; Bast & Pyle, supra note 11, at 297; Hanson, supra note 11, at 582-83;
Haigh, supra note 11, at 249, 256.
71. See sources cited supra note 49; Berring, Collapse, supra note 11, at 19 n. 19 (citing JOHN R. SEARLE,
THE REDISCOVERY OF THE MIND (1992) and pointing out how conceptual schemas inscribed in our
brains channel what we can think, regardless of the technology we are employing at the moment);
Lien, supra note 11, at 125 (pointing out that excessive computer use can reinforce the weaknesses of
analytical thinking at the expensive of the global version); see also Bintliff, supra note I1, at 350.
72. Compare Haigh, supra note 11, at 261 (implying that computer users may, because of thought pat-
terns instilled in law school and textbooks, ask unimaginative queries), and Dabney, supra note 11, at
8, and Berring, Cognitive Authority, supra note I 1, at 1693 (noting that West categories mirrored the
divisions in the first-year law school curriculum), and Berring, Evolution, supra note 1I, at 309-10
(noting that Blackstone, Langdell, the traditional law school curriculum, and West categories all
reinforce a common mindset and determine what, for lawyers, is thinkable). For discussions of ways
that common mental quirks, irrational habits and preferences, and other forms of ingrained cogni-
tive thought patterns channel legal and ordinary behavior, see, e.g., Ronald Chen & Jon Hanson,
Categorically Biased: The Influence of Knowledge Structures on Law and Legal Theory, 77 S.
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deal of information; the searcher feels in control. We feel that our problem is only
one more search away. But, like ace detective Dupin, we may easily find ourselves
looking in the wrong direction.
Problems Associated with the User
29 Drowning in a sea of facts (perseverating). Computers are better at search-
ing for cases containing particular facts than ones presenting abstract ideas.73 For
example, imagine that one's client is an African American woman who has been
fired because she came to work one day wearing her hair in braids.74 Her employer,
who likes black men and white women, has fired her for wearing a hair style he
associates with black women, who he thinks are defiant and hard to control. Black
men and white women enjoy much greater latitude in how they can wear their hair
at work.
30 To find out how other Title VII cases have dealt with this question, the law-
yer searches for cases containing the terms "discrimination," "African American
woman," "hair," and "braids." The search turns up only a handful of cases, none on
point, so the lawyer broadens the search to include African Americans of either sex
fired for wearing their hair in cornrows or Afros, or for wearing blond wigs. Again
finding relatively few cases (and even fewer that were successful), the lawyer again
broadens the search to include Asian American plaintiffs who wore their hair in
pigtails, Sikhs who wore turbans, and teenagers who incurred the wrath of school
authorities for wearing their hair in Mohawks or dyed purple.
31 The lawyer, in short, focuses on the most distinctive fact of his case-that
his client suffered workplace discipline for her hairstyle-and frames the search
accordingly. This way of proceeding leads to a theory of the case as a deprivation
of a right to personal appearance-in short, as a substantive due process claim
seeking relief under Title VII or the Equal Protection Clause. This claim has only
a remote chance of prevailing.
32 What the lawyer can easily overlook is that the case calls for a new theory
of intersectional discrimination.75 The client, who is both a woman and an African
American, suffers a form of discrimination targeted against her on account of her
CAL. L. REV. 1103 (2003); Christine Jolls et al., A Behavioral Approach to Law and Economics, 50
STAN. L. REV. 1471 (1997); Cass R. Sunstein, Behavioral Analysis of Law, 64 U. CHI. L. REV. 1175
(1997); Jon D. Hanson & Douglas A. Kysar, Taking Behavioralism Seriously: The Problem of Market
Manipulation, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 630 (1999).
73. See supra notes 67-69; Post, supra note , at 98-99; Lien, supra note , at 89, 93, 123-25 (comput-
erized searches reinforce weaknesses of concrete, analytic thinking style), 130, 133; Hanson, supra
note 11, at 575, 578-79.
74. For an earlier treatment of this example, see Delgado & Stefancic, supra note 3, at 219-20. For
analysis of the general problem of the intersectional client, see Paulette M. Caldwell, A Hair Piece:
Perspectives on the Intersection of Race and Gender, 1991 DUKE L.J. 365 (discussing Rogers v.
American Airlines, Inc., 527 F. Supp. 229 (S.D.N.Y. 1981)).
75. See Caldwell, supra note 74, at 371-81. For further discussion of this idea, see Richard DELGADO &
JEAN STEFANCIC, CRITICAL RACE THEORY: AN INTRODUCTION 9, 51-56, 100, 149 (2000).
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black womanhood. Her employer, who does not discriminate against black men
(perhaps finding them ebullient, musical, and fun to talk sports with on Monday)7 6
nor against white women (perhaps finding them ornamental or comforting, like his
mother), is biased against black women and eventually finds a pretext for firing
each one.7" Suing for either sex- or race-based discrimination alone is likely to
fail, for the employer can truthfully say that he is not prejudiced against blacks (in
particular, not against black men) or women (who are white, that is), indeed has
many of both kinds of employee in his workplace and gets along with them fine.
Title VII needs to develop a theory of intersectional discrimination for cases, like
this, lying at the intersection of two protected categories but unprotected by either,
but will not do so if attorneys fixate on the factual specifics of particular cases,
overlooking the need to develop new law to fill in the gap in Title VII coverage.
33 Losing the opportunity to browse or frame a metaphor. Computers can
render their users less creative in other ways. For example, a searcher who begins
with an index category in a legal digest or practice guide is likely at least to glance
at adjacent categories. This browsing encourages the development of analogical or
metaphorical reasoning and legal arguments that stretch existing theories to cover
new factual settings. 78 For example, in the case mentioned above, the lawyer who
pursues a traditional search with the aid of hard-copy materials might easily find
a reference to very recent law review articles by critical race feminists discussing
intersectional discrimination. 79 The lawyer might also come across discussions of
novel theories for nontraditional plaintiffs, such as gay couples, 80 animals,"1 inde-
terminate plaintiffs, 82 or inanimate objects83 that might suggest that the African
76. See Mitu Gulati & Devon Carbado, Working Identity, 85 CORNELL L. REV. 1259 (2000).
77. That is, the employer does not dislike blackness, per se-he gets along fine with black men. And by
the same token, he can say truthfully that he is not biased against women-in particular he likes ones
who are white. He is just biased against black women like the client.
78. See supra notes 70-71 and accompanying text; Haigh, supra note 11, at 248, 261; Berring, Backing
into the Future, supra note 11, at 54; Steven Alan Childress, The Hazards of Computer-Assisted
Research to the Legal Profession, 55 OKLA. B.J. 1531, 1533 (1984). Computer-generated lists of cases
emerge from the printer devoid of any context. The user gains little information about a case's his-
tory, predecessors, or the cultural setting that gave rise to it. Rita Reusch, The Search for Analogous
Legal Authority: How to Find it When You Don't Know What You are Looking For, LEGAL REFERENCE
SERVICES Q., 1984, no. 3, at 33; Haigh, supra note 11, at 247, 251; Lien, supra note 11, at 101, 128.
79. E.g., Caldwell, supra note 74; Richard Delgado, Rodrigo's Sixth Chronicle: Intersections, Essences,
and the Dilemma of Social Reform, 68 N.Y.U. L. REV. 639 (1993); Sumi K. Cho, Converging
Stereotypes in Racialized Sexual Harassment: Where the Model Minority Meets Suzie Wong, I J.
GENDER, RACE & JUST. 177 (1997).
80. E.g., William N. Eskridge, Jr., A Jurisprudence of "Coming Out": Religion, Homosexuality,
Collisions of Liberty and Equality in American Public Law, 106 YALE L.J. 2411 (1997); Andrew
Koppelman, Why Discrimination Against Lesbians and Gay Men Is Sex Discrimination, 69 N.Y.U.
L. REV. 197 (1994); Janet E. Halley, Sexual Orientation and the Politics of Biology: A Critique of the
Argument from Immutability, 46 STAN. L. REV. 503 (1994); Joe Rollins, Same-Sex Unions and the
Spectacles of Recognition, 39 LAW & Soc'Y REV. 457 (2005).
81. E.g., GARY L. FRANCIONE, ANIMALS, PROPERTY, AND THE LAW (1995); Gary Francione, Animal Rights
Theory and Utilitarianism: Relative Normative Guidance, 3 ANIMAL L. 75 (1997).
82. E.g., Richard Delgado, Beyond Sindell: Relaxation of Cause-in-Fact Rules for Indeterminate
Plaintiffs, 70 CALIF. L. REV. 881 (1982).
83. E.g., Christopher Stone, Should Trees Have Standing? Toward Legal Rights for Natural Objects, 45
S. CAL. L. REV. 450 (1972).
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American woman, too, needs a new legal theory for the form of discrimination
she has endured. Since a searcher who uses one of the two main electronic legal
databases is unlikely to engage in conceptual browsing, 4 these alternative theories
might easily remain undeveloped.
134 Unwarranted confidence. More importantly, a computer cannot be dis-
contented. A client can, and an attorney may have a nagging feeling that the law
governing her client's case is inadequate. But the impulse to pursue a better avenue
cannot come from a computer. All the pieces of a law reform case may lie some-
where in a database,8 5 but lacking in context. The decision to put them together in
a novel way must come from a human researcher. Only a human can realize that
legal remedies and social needs are out of step. Only a human can imagine a bet-
ter world. That act of imagination requires stepping back and pondering history,
politics, and the development of case law over time.8 6 Looking for ever more cases
about clients who suffered adverse consequences for wearing their hair the wrong
way is not the way to make that imaginative leap. Mindless computer searching
can remove the researcher even further from a solution than when he began. And
because computer users feel omnipotent, even godlike,87 the state of dissatisfaction
that law reform presupposes may be slow in coming.
84. The recent introduction of links and hypertext in computerized databases solves part of this problem.
But it remains coercive and editor-driven, and reintroduces the problem of narrow authority and
mindset of which we wrote in our earlier article. See Delgado & Stefancic, supra note 3, at 221-22.
On hypertext and electronic links, see Katsh. supra note 52, at 1141, 1150-5 1. On the possibility that
future databases might ameliorate this problem, see infra note 112.
85. For example, when Samuel Warren and Louis Brandeis invented the tort of invasion of the right of
privacy, they built on recognition of a host of related rights, such as freedom from unlawful searches
and seizures. See Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193
(1890); William L. Prosser, Privacy, 48 CAL. L. REV. 383 (1960). Prosser also wrote about privacy in
his famous hornbook on torts, WILLIAM L. PROSSER & W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON
ON THE LAW OF TORTS (5th ed. 1984). Prosser built on the earlier work of Warren and Brandeis in his
1960 solo article, and broke the tort into four distinct torts. See also THOMAS M. COOLEY, A TREATISE
ON THE LAW OF TORTS 29 (1 st ed. 1880), a very early piece about "the right to be let alone." For the
observation that electronic searching yields cases without context, see Bast & Pyle, supra note 1I, at
298; Haigh, supra note 11, at 247 ("electronic data remove this context and create the impression of
information that comes from nowhere, outside of time"); Lien, supra note 11, at 128, 130.
Simple ignorance may impede other researchers. A database may contain a wealth of information
under a legal term of art, but the user may not know it; or perhaps a judge writes "this precedent can
no longer guide us" but a search on "overruled" would not find that statement.
86. Steve Lubet, Trial Theory and Blind Poetics, 100 NW. U. L. REV. 295, 295 (2006) ("Every successful
case starts with an act of imagination"); George Taylor, Legal Consciousness and Ricoeur's Theory
of Imagination (2006) (unpublished manuscript, on file with authors).
87. E.g., Bintliff, supra note 11, at 345, 349; Berring, Evolution, supra note 11, at 313; Bast & Pyle, supra
note 11, at 292-93. Users feel important and in control. Because they can, theoretically, find anything,
they believe they have mastered the material. Like law professors writing an article who photocopy
dozens of cases and articles, rationalizing "I'll read them later," they believe they have the situation
well in hand. See Lien, supra note I1, at I 18 (students equated ability to access material with mastery
of it). By the same token, the electronic searcher who quickly and easily finds a case or two can stop
too soon-before encountering further material that might enable him or her to take the analysis to a
deeper level. Barkan, supra note 11, at 632 n.77 (citing KARL LLEWELLYN, JURISPRUDENCE: REALISM
IN THEORY AND PRACTICE 82 (1962)) (describing the tendency in any form of thinking to be satisfied
with the most available material).
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135 Imagining new worlds. New ideas come from turning a structure of
thought on its side and looking at it in a new way-flipping it or turning it inside
out.88 In race relations, for example, one thinks of white privilege8 9 or challenges
to the black-white binary paradigm of race.9" The first development challenges us
to imagine a world in which whites are not bearers of privilege and recipients of
a system of reciprocal "courtesies," a world where courtesy, usually thought of as
a good, was bad. 9 A focus on white privilege flips the usual civil rights question,
which asks whether an act by a white suppressing a Latino or black is action-
able. It asks, instead, whether whites' distribution of benefits to each other, to the
exclusion of members of out-groups, is actionable. 92 And the second concept-of
a black-white binary paradigm of race9 3-- challenges us to examine whether a
body of civil rights statutes and cases framed with black history in mind can deal
adequately with the injuries non-black groups suffer, such as discrimination on the
basis of a foreign accent, suspected undocumented status, national origin, or ste-
reotypes as sneaky, lazy, or devious.94 Many new legal ideas come about the same
way-by turning a thought structure around and asking a novel question. In race
relations law, the duty to make reparations to Latinos for stolen lands95 or blacks
because of slavery96 appeared frustrated by the simple passage of time. But what
if one imagined a world where the duty to make good for old injuries increased,
rather than decreased, over time because of interest-compounding; or one where
mixed causation and indeterminacy in the plaintiff class was handled by prorat-
ing harms, 97 not declaring them noncompensable? What if one imagined a world
where outsiders did not need to "cover" or conceal the ground of their different-
ness, as many gays, lesbians, and light-skinned minorities do?98 It seems unlikely
88. See Richard Delgado, The Current Landscape of Race: New Targets, Old Opportunities, 104 MICH.
L. REV. 1269, 1270 (2006).
89. Id. at 1271, 1279-80. See generally PEGGY MCINTOSH, WHITE PRIVILEGE AND MALE PRIVILEGE: A
PERSONAL ACCOUNT OF COMING TO SEE CORRESPONDENCES THROUGH WORK IN WOMEN'S STUDIES
(1988); STEPHANIE WILDMAN, PRIVILEGE REVEALED: How INVISIBLE PREFERENCE UNDERMINES
AMERICA (1996).
90. See, e.g., Juan Perea, The Black-White Binary Paradigm of Race, 85 CAL. L. REV. 1213 (1997);
Richard Delgado, Rodrigo's Fifteenth Chronicle: Racial Mixture, Latino-Critical Scholarship, and
the Black-White Binary, 75 TEX. L. REV. 1181 (1997).
91. See Delgado, supra note 88, at 1279-80.
92. Id.
93. See Perea, supra note 90.
94. These stereotypes are ones that the dominant society assigns to Latinos and some Asians, but does
not often assign to blacks. See, e.g., Richard Delgado & Jean Stefancic, Images of the Outsider in
American Law and Culture: Can Free Expression Remedy Systemic Social Ills? 77 CORNELL L.
REV. 1258, 1270-75 (1992); Richard Delgado, Derrick Bell's Toolkit: Fit to Dismantle that Famous
House? 75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 283, 298 (2000).
95. See generally U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, TREATY OF GUADALUPE HIDALGO: FINDINGS AND
POSSIBLE OPTIONS REGARDING LONGSTANDING COMMUNITY LAND GRANT CLAIMS IN NEW MEXICO
(2004), available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/dO459.pdf.
96. See, e.g., Charles Ogletree, Jr., Repairing the Past: New Efforts in Reparations Debate in America,
38 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 279 (2003); RANDALL ROBINSON, THE DEBT: WHAT AMERICA OWES TO
BLACKS (2000).
97. See Delgado, supra note 82, at 891-908.
98. See generally KENJI YOSHINO, COVERING: THE HIDDEN ASSAULT ON OUR CIVIL RIGHTS (2006) (discuss-
ing this psychological strategy); Gulati & Carbado, supra note 76, at 1308 n.125.
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that computer searching, with its emphasis on the concrete, offers a pathway to
new theories such as these.
99
36 Formalism and perseveration. Computer searching teaches formalism,
a conservative approach to law, because it conceals the lesson of contingency. It
masks how most decisions could easily have gone the other way.100 It is like a
wide-angle lens that lets you see more, not a telescope that lets you see further or
a microscope that allows you to see more deeply into something. Legal innova-
tion requires dissatisfaction with the world and a personal commitment to making
it better.'0 ' Mindlessly scanning an infinitude of cases about workers with hair
problems is unlikely to strengthen either of these prerequisites. Computerized
research may occasionally help an attorney locate one case, different in some
minute respect from the others, where the judge ruled favorably. But the attorney
who fails to find such a case can do little but send the client away with the words,
"Sorry, the law is not in our favor."
37 Consider, again, the case of the black woman fired for wearing her hair in
a style (braids) her supervisor associates with African Americans.' 0 2 As we have
seen, neither traditional hard-copy nor electronic searching would have provided
much assistance, at least early on. What about the next case? Until an appellate
judge upholds a theory of intersectional discrimination and calls it by that name,
the second litigant is apt to find herself little better off. Imagine that this second
worker is an African American woman fired, not for wearing her hair in braids but
in cornrows. The attorney researching the second case may fail to find the first case
because the computer is highly literal; it finds no cornrow cases. But even if the
attorney broadens the search to include hair worn in styles common in minority
communities, such as braids, pigtails, turbans, Afros, and cornrows, and so comes
across the first case, the judge may well decide that the first judge was overreact-
ing ("hair is such a small thing, why, when I was in the Army.. . .") and decline
to follow it. Skimming the first case on his office computer, the second judge may
decide it is an ordinary due process case about the right of personal appearance.
Electronic searching can thus lead to judicial minimalism-narrow, fact-based
99. E.g., Hanson, supra note 11, at 7, 10-12; Lien, supra note 11, at 89, 123-24, 130, 133. An interdis-
ciplinary scholar, of course, confronts the practical problem of devising word searches employing the
vocabularies and terms of more than one discipline.
100. E.g., Lien, supra note 11, at 126-33. But see Barkan, supra note 11, at 636 (positing that electronic
searching may reinforce formalism and the search for the one right answer somewhat less than the
old paper-and-pencil kind); Schanck, supra note I 1, at 13 (noting that "one can be a Legal Realist
and still use the term 'authority' without being contradictory"). It is noteworthy that computer search-
ing only informs you what cases a judge followed; it does not tell you which ones he did not follow,
because judges rarely list these-just as they usually do not list facts that cut "the other way." They
simply ignore them.
101. See GERALD LOPEZ, REBELLIOUS LAWYERING: ONE CHICANO'S VISION OF PROGRESSIVE LAW PRACTICE
(1992); Julie A. Su, Making the Invisible Visible: The Garment Industry's Dirty Laundry, I J. GENDER,
RACE & JUST. 405 (1998); Richard Delgado & Jean Stefancic, Norms & Narratives: Can Judges Avoid
Serious Moral Error? 69 TEX. L. REV. 1929 (1991).
102. See supra 'fi 29-33.
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decision making that ignores emerging legal theories and decides cases on the
narrowest possible grounds.
10 3
138 Computer searching is better at helping one find concrete examples rather
than broad, abstract patterns-unless, of course, these happen to be ones the
searcher is expressly looking for. And fact-based searching by itself does little
to help organize disparate strands of cases into a new legal theory and can easily
cause you to miss one that is emerging in another jurisdiction.
39 Driving us apart. With Internet searching (as opposed to the case law kind)
another limitation sets in. Internet use can polarize society by encouraging users
with pre-existing proclivities to find material that reinforces what they already
believe. 104 Conservatives search for conservative Web sites, liberals consult liberal
ones. Lawyers with an interest in original intent look for articles, books, and blogs
supporting that idea; lawyers interested in documenting the failures of supply-side
economics read material supporting that. The impulse to come to terms with the
world as it is can atrophy as one reads more and more material that reinforces
one's views. Needless to say, lawyers who are trapped in their worldview to the
point where they cannot comprehend the other side or make a balanced argument
will be poor agents for law reform.
Problems Associated with the Way Information
Appears in Electronic Databases
40 In addition to problems stemming from the human user, a second set arises
because of the way data appear in electronic collections. Consider, for example,
newspaper files and Web pages.
41 A recent report showed that newspaper headline editors are beginning
to compose titles for articles that are literal and concrete. 15 Formerly, they
might have devised a title that included a double entendre, a literary or his-
torical reference, or one that placed the story in a larger social setting. The
impetus behind the new literal titles is the need to make sure that LexisNexis
searchers find the story; an allusive title might appeal to the educated reader
but result in fewer hits.' °6 This trend, while improving access, reduces the
number of associations a reader is likely to make between this article and
another he or she may have read. If the user is a lawyer trying to make sense
of an emerging legal problem, it makes the news less likely to suggest a
promising lead.
103. On the philosophy of judicial minimalism, see, e.g., Margaret J. Radin & Frank Michelman,
Pragmatist and Poststructural Critical Legal Practice, 139 U. PA. L. REV. 1019 (1991).
104. See CASS SUNSTEIN, REPUBLICCOM (2001). On the creation of a second, generational gap, see supra
notes 44-45.
105. Steve Lohr, This Boring Headline is Written for Google, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 9, 2006, at 14 (Week in
Review).
106. Id.
Why Do We Ask the Same Questions?
42 Internet searching presents a different obstacle. Most material on the
Internet comes arranged in order of frequency of use.10 7 Web sites and home pages
that previous users have visited many times appear high on the page, less used
ones further down. 0 8 This "popularity contest" approach to listing information
builds in a structural bias in favor of commonplace items that have found wide use.
Heretical or new ideas that are just beginning to be noticed may easily escape the
attention of a busy searcher.
43 Running through most of these problems with electronic searching is
the limitation mentioned earlier: We can only search in terms of categories and
words. 0 9 And if these categories are the same ones that appeared in the hard-copy
searching we performed in a previous era, transferring our query from a decennial
digest volume to a computerized database is apt to bring few gains. Indeed, replac-
ing hard-copy searching with the computerized version can introduce a new set of
problems. It can mire us in facts," 0 bring us into contact with material organized
in traditional and unimaginative fashion,"' and discourage browsing and analogi-
cal thinkingI 2-all the while making us believe we are fully in control, 1 3 when
reform requires anxiety and discontent with the world as it is."I4
44 For all these reasons, one should hesitate to award computerized legal
research high marks for its contribution to law reform and innovation. The con-
cluding section reinforces these reservations by briefly reviewing the pace of law
reform in a few selected areas.
The Pace of Law Reform Before and After the Advent of
Computerized Research
45 The 1960s were a period of legal ferment. Legal services attorneys developed
theories of wrongful and constructive eviction, repair and deduct, and a host of
similar remedies for poor renters.'1 5 Consumer advocates developed the implied
107. See, e.g., Betting, Evolution, supra note 11, at 316; see also Google, Our Search: Google Technology,
http://www.google.com/technology (last visited Dec. 19, 2006) (explaining how the company arrives
at its search locations).
108. Berring, Evolution, supra note 11, at 316.
109. See supra note 17 and accompanying text.
110. See supra notes 67-70 and accompanying text.
111. See supra note 74 and accompanying text and 35.
112. See supra 33. To be sure, some of these problems are merely technical, so that later generations of
computer designers could solve them by, for instance, building in a display more conducive to brows-
ing than the present one.
113. See supra 34.
114. See supra IN 34-35. Of course, commercial database may reintroduce elements of the print-based
system in the form of programs like KeySearch, which are thesaural in nature and based on the old
key number system. This merely defeats the power of computers. See Lee Peoples, The Death of the
Digest and the Pitfalls of Electronic Research, 97 LAW LIB. J. 661, 666, 675 (2005).
115. On the development of this remedy, which allows a tenant whose landlord has refused to fix a danger-
ous stairway or other condition to repair it himself and deduct the cost from next month's rent, see
Special Project, Self-Help: Extrajudicial Rights, Privileges and Remedies in Contemporary American
Society (pt. 2 of 2), 37 VAND. L. REV. 845, 954-63 (1984).
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warranty of merchantability and theories to challenge ex parte repossessions of
items purchased on installment contracts. 1' 6 Early feminists insisted on the value
of women's work and demanded that women's occupations, such as nursing and
teaching, should receive pay equal to that of traditional men's jobs. 17 Lawyers for
the poor developed the notion of unconscionable contracts and contracts of adhe-
sion.' Draft counselors and selective service attorneys broadened conscientious
objection to include belief systems that played a part in the life of an objector
comparable to that which Quakerism or the Mennonite religion played in the life
of a registrant clearly entitled to exemption.1
19
46 Just before this period, civil rights lawyers in Mendez v. Westminster
School District2 ° (and later Brown v. Board of Education121 ) attacked separate but
equal schools by demonstrating that they could never be equal because they stig-
matized children assigned there on account of race. Criminal attorneys and public
defenders broadened search-and-seizure law' 22 and that of forced confessions,
123
and established the right of an indigent defendant to an appointed attorney. 124 Early
critical race theorists challenged free speech orthodoxy, 125 the usefulness of liberal
remedies, 126 imperial scholarship, 127 and the inherent conflict of interest in much
public interest litigation when the attorney wants one thing-usually establish-
ment of a pristine new right-and the client another. 1
28
116. See, e.g., Sniadach v. Family Fin. Corp., 395 U.S. 337 (1969); Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67
(1972).
117. On the theory of "comparable worth," that nurses, for example, should receive pay equal to that of
electricians, see, e.g., Ruth G. Blumrosen, Wage Discrimination, Job Segregation, and Title VII of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 12 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 399 (1979). On the development of theories that
housework should receive value, see, e.g., JOAN WILLIAMS, UNBENDING GENDER: WHY FAMILY AND
WORK CONFLICT AND WHAT TO DO ABOUT IT 172-75 (2000).
118. See, e.g., Friederick Kessler, Contracts of Adhesion-Some Thoughts About Freedom of Contract, 43
COLUM. L. REV. 629 (1943).
119. See, e.g., Seeger v. United States, 380 U.S. 163 (1965); Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S. 333
(1970).
120. 161 F.2d 774 (9th Cir. 1947).
121. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
122. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
123. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
124. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
125. E.g., Richard Delgado, Words That Wound: A Tort Action for Racial Insults, Epithets, and Name-
Calling, 17 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 133 (1982); Charles Lawrence, If He Hollers, Let Him Go:
Regulating Racist Speech on Campus, 1990 DUKE L.J. 431; Mari Matsuda, Public Response to Racist
Speech: Considering the Victim 's Story, 87 MICH. L. REV. 2320 (1989); DELGADO & STEFANCIC, supra
note 75, at 20-24, 27-28, 31-32, 70, 116-18, 147.
126. E.g., Alan D. Freeman, Legitimizing Racial Discrimination through Antidiscrimination Law: A
Critical Review of Supreme Court Doctrine, 62 MINN. L. REV. 1049 (1978); Kimberl6 Crenshaw,
Race, Reform, and Retrenchment: Transformation and Legitimation in Antidiscrimination Law, 101
HARV. L. REV. 1331 (1988); DELGADO & STEFANCIC, supra note 75, at 57-58, 121-25, 150.
127. See generally Richard Delgado, The Imperial Scholar: Reflections on a Review of Civil Rights
Literature, 132 U. PA. L. REV. 561 (1984).
128. See generally Derrick Bell, Serving Two Masters: Integration Ideals and Client Interests in School
Desegregation Litigation, 85 YALE L.J. 470 (1976).
Why Do We Ask the Same Questions?
47 In environmental law, one thinks of Chris Stone's championing of legal
rights for natural objects 129 and the notion that trees should have standing. One
thinks, as well, of Joe Sax's suggestion that we consider ourselves in a trust-like
relationship to the natural world with an obligation to preserve that world for
future generations.'
30
48 None of these innovations seems to have received a boost from electronic
searching; indeed, the pace of law reform seems to have slowed since it arrived in
the early 1980s. Color-blind jurisprudence has slowed the pace of racial reform,'
3'
and when legislators imposed tort reforms limiting the ability of consumers and
victims of medical malpractice to recover for their injuries,' 13 2 the tort bar had little
response. Similarly, when conservative judges and legislators began limiting con-
sumer remedies, for example, by insisting that patients mediate their claims against
HMOs and doctors who committed malpractice,'3 3 lawyers responded with no new
legal theories, even though many were (and still are) available. 134 (Why not, for
example, a cause of action for bad-faith mediation against HMOs that routinely
deny malpractice claims or requests for referral to a specialist, all in order to keep
costs down?) On some governmental agency Web sites, information that might
have aided law reformers, but is critical of the current administration, has simply
disappeared. 3 ' And critical race theory, after a highly productive first ten years,
seems to be bogged down in discourse analysis and identity politics.
136
49 Of course, many factors-conservative Republican administrations, a
backlash against the "wild" sixties and seventies, and globalization-may have
129. Stone, supra note 83.
130. See JOSEPH SAX, MOUNTAINS WITHOUT HANDRAILS: REFLECTIONS ON THE NATIONAL PARKS (1980);
Joseph L. Sax, The Public Trust Doctrine in Natural Resource Law: Effective Judicial Intervention,
68 MICH. L. REV. 471 (1970); see also Richard Delgado, Our Better Natures: A Revisionist View
of Joseph Sax's Public Trust Theory of Environmental Protection, and Some Dark Thoughts on the
Possibility of Law Reform, 44 VAND. L. REV. 1209 (1991).
131. See City of Richmond v. Croson, 488 U.S. 469 (1989); Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S.
200 (1995); MICHAEL BROWN ET AL., COLOR-BLIND RACISM (2005); LESLIE G. CARR, "COLOR-BLIND"
RACISM (1997); DELGADO & STEFANCIC, supra note 75, at 7, 21-23, 103-07, 144 (discussing color-
blind jurisprudence).
132. On tort reform, see Michael Rustad & Thomas Koenig, The Historical Continuity of Punitive
Damages Awards: Reforming the Tort Reformers, 42 AM. U. L. REV. 1269 (1993).
133. On the trend toward mediation of these claims, see Ann H. Nevers, Medical Malpractice Arbitration
in the New Millennium: Much Ado About Nothing? I PEPP. DIsp. RESOL. L.J. 45 (2000).
134. A few new legal approaches came about in connection with cigarette and pharmaceutical mass torts.
See David Cay Johnston & Melanie Warner, Tobacco Makers Lose Key Ruling on Latest Suits, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 26, 2006, at Al (court certifies class action brought by smokers of light cigarettes pro-
moted as safer).
135. See Susan Nevelow Mart, Let the People Know the Facts: Can Government Information Removed
from the Internet be Reclaimed? 98 LAW. LIBR. J. 7, 14-21 (2006) (documenting the removal of
information by the Department of Labor, the National Cancer Institute, the Civil Rights Commission,
and other agencies from their Web sites).
136. On the way critical race theory has strayed from hard-edged materialist analysis of race and racial
history toward a more abstract focus on "discourse," see, e.g., Richard Delgado, Crossroads and
Blind Alleys: A Critical Examination of Recent Writing about Race, 82 TEX. L. REV. 121 (2003);
Symposium, Going Back to Class, I I MICH. J. RACE & L. I (2005).
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played a part in slowing the pace of law reform, at least of the progressive kind.' 37
If, as this cursory review suggests, computerized searching has not been a godsend
for legal reformers and may have actively impeded the search for new theories and
remedies, what is to be done about it? How can we continue to enjoy the speed and
convenience of online searching without incurring the costs it can easily exact?
Conclusion
50 One possibility that we must entertain is that when searching for a new legal
remedy, we should turn our computers off. Lawyers interested in representing cli-
ents who (unlike corporations) do not find a ready-made body of developed law in
their favor need to spend time with the computer shut down, mulling over what an
ideal legal world would look like from the client's perspective. Such lawyers need
to practice thinking "outside the box," reinventing, modifying, flipping, and radi-
cally transforming legal doctrines and theories imaginatively and in brainstorming
sessions with other reformist lawyers. In this exercise, the free association of ideas,
policies, and social needs will play a large part-the eleventh or twelfth case of an
African American worker denied a promotion because of her hairstyle will not.
151 Lawyers need to be aware of what computers can and cannot do, and
how some of the most frustrating limitations are ones that come embedded in
our conceptual repertoires.' 3 8 Some of these limitations hampered old-fashioned
paper-and-pencil searching. But the computer revolution has not eliminated them
because the law school curriculum, CLE courses, bar examinations, and the struc-
ture of legal practice encourage us to think along predictable lines. To break loose
from hidebound patterns requires more than vast quantities of material linked by
some common fact. It requires a conceptual advance that sees old material in a
new light. A computer is good at showing you what is. It cannot show you what
might be. Believing so is an abdication of one's responsibility as a lawyer and an
agent for change.
137. Conservative think tanks and litigation centers have been highly active, even "creative" during this
period. See generally MANUEL GONZALES & RICHARD DELGADO, THE POLITICS OF FEAR (2006).
138. Other limitations are built into the very architecture of cyberspace-what Lawrence Lessig calls the
code. See Bast & Pyle, supra note 11, at 299-302 (citing LAWRENCE LESSIG, CODE AND OTHER LAWS
OF CYBERSPACE (1999)). Attorneys who search blithely unaware of how the code structures what they
can find on their computer will suffer from a second, equally insidious form of determinism.
[Vol. 99:2
